“[This] I Know from My Grandfather”: The Battle for Admissibility of Indigenous Oral History as Proof of Tribal Land Claims by Babcock, Hope M.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2013 
“[This] I Know from My Grandfather”: The Battle for Admissibility 
of Indigenous Oral History as Proof of Tribal Land Claims 
Hope M. Babcock 
Georgetown University Law Center, babcock@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1643 
 
37 Am. Indian L. Rev. 19-61 (2013) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
"[THIS] I KNOW FROM MY GRANDFATHER:"' THE
BATTLE FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF INDIGENOUS ORAL
HISTORY AS PROOF OF TRIBAL LAND CLAIMS
Hope M Babcock*
Abstract
A major obstacle indigenous land claimants must face is the application
of federal evidentiary rules, like the hearsay doctrine, which block the use
of oral history to establish legal claims. It is often oral history and stories
that tribes rely upon as evidence to support their claims, reducing
substantially the likelihood of a tribe prevailing. Indigenous oral history
presents unique challenges to judges when faced with its admissibility.
Canadian courts have largely overcome these challenges by interpreting
evidentiary rules liberally, in favor of the aborigines. As such, Canadian
aborigines have enjoyed greater land claim success than indigenous
claimants in the United States, raising the question why United States
courts do not follow the Canadian example. After examining the
evidentiary strengths and weaknesses of indigenous oral history and the
barriers posed to its admissibility in court, this article finds the answer is the
willingness of Canada to both recognize the harm done to aboriginal
peoples during the country's colonial history and to make amends by
opening the courts to these claims.
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Introduction
If our federal courts are to respond to this nation's commitment
to cultural diversity, they must be prepared to hear and really
listen to Native American voices, quite different from their own,
speaking in terms shaped by their non-literate cultural heritage.
By doing so, the federal courts would be honoring the Western,
liberal tradition that. they inherit based on the idea that everyone
benefits by adding voices to the marketplace of ideas.
Both the United States and Canada have faced similar judicial hurdles in
determining land title claims between Indian and non-Indian claimants.
The results have varied greatly between the two court systems, largely
because of different evidentiary rules and different attitudes toward
indigenous claimants.
U.S. courts have typically closed their doors to indigenous oral history as
proof of Indian land claims based on the hearsay and best evidence rules,
because the original story teller cannot be produced and there is no written
2. Glen Stohr, Comment, The Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law, 31
Aiz. ST. L.J. 679, 704 (1999).
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record to confirm the recounted events.3 Yet these stories often are the
"best" evidence of such claims; in fact, they may be the only evidence.
Because tribal land claims can dispossess current non-Indian landowners or
require the payment of large sums of money to settle such claims, they
disrupt the existing economic, social, and political order.5 Evidentiary rules
that block their realization, therefore, frequently have popular and judicial
support - even in Canada, where oral history has been more accepted.6
The fluctuating and ever-shifting federal policies toward Indians, a
pendulum between assimilation and self-determination, makes it is easy to
see why the United States would be hesitant to grant Indian claimants a
right to use oral history in court - allowing such evidence could make
Indians successful in their land claims.
Despite the commonality between the United States and Canada's early
experience with its indigenous peoples and shared attitudes toward them,8
Canada's recent history with its indigenous peoples is quite different from
the United States. This departure is due principally to a 1982 constitutional
amendment recognizing the rights of First Nation peoples. 9  This
constitutional reconciliation has had a positive impact on aboriginal
3. See infra at 39-41 (discussing examples of U.S. courts rejecting oral history as proof
of an Indian land claim).
4. See, e.g., GARETH DuNcAN & GILLIAN PIGGOTT, ABORIGINAL TITLE IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA: TSILHQOT'IN NATION V. BRITISH COLUMBIA 1 (2008) (discussing the recent
Canadian Supreme Court decision that recognized the group's title to approximately 200,000
hectares, roughly half of the claim area, and granted the tribe hunting and trapping rights in
the entire claimed area).
5. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 657 ("To grant sub-groups a
special status or alternative basis for defining themselves calls into question the
'substantiality of the ethical order' that defines 'rights' in terms of individuals.").
6. See David Milward, Doubting What the Elders Have to Say: A Critical Examination
of Canadian Judicial Treatment ofAboriginal Oral History Evidence, 14 INT'L J. EVIDENCE
& PROOF 287, 302 (2010) ("A legal realist appraisal may well conclude that the real
objective is to keep Aboriginal interests subordinated to Canadian state sovereignty and
policies.").
7. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 659.
8. Elizabeth Furniss, Indians, Odysseys and Vast, Empty Lands: The Myth of the
Frontier in the Canadian Justice System, 41 ANTHROPOLOGICA 195, 197 (1999).
9. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.) (entitled "Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada," and provides as follows:
"The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.").
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claimants, leading Canadian courts to make admissible indigenous oral
history when proffered in support of an aboriginal land claim.'0
A close examination of what constitutes tribal oral history, how it is
developed, and how it is passed between generations shows it is more
reliable and enduring than one might believe." Tribal stories are not
equivalent to the utterances barred under the hearsay rule, and are
frequently better evidence than what the written historical record contains.12
While questions remain about the trustworthiness of oral history and the
fitness of courts to deal with evidence from indigenous cultures, the
Canadian experience shows that there is sufficient flexibility in the rules of
evidence to enable courts to accept oral history and weigh its probative
value, as with any other evidence. Sufficient safeguards can also be put in
place to establish authenticity and improve reliability.
But, unlike Canada, the United States does not have a constitutional
directive to "reconcile" indigenous and non-indigenous interests. Without
this type of constitutional amendment in the United States, U.S. courts have
little motivation to lend evidentiary credence to tribal oral history in support
of Indian land claims.
This article discusses the challenges a common law court faces when
dealing with indigenous oral history in a tribal land claim proceeding and
how those challenges can be overcome. The primary goal of this article is
to showcase the injustice of the current evidentiary barriers to tribal oral
history in the United States and to expose the lack of a rational basis for
maintaining those barriers, especially in light of the Canadian judicial
experience.
The first part of this article explains the importance of land to indigenous
peoples, and exposes some fundamental differences in the judicial approach
of Canada and the United States toward the legal basis of indigenous
claims. This part also lays out how Canadian aboriginal claimants establish
a land claim. The second part, after briefly introducing the tribal practice of
legal storytelling, discusses indigenous oral history, its various purposes,
the forms that it may take, the ways in which it may be transmitted over
time, and the important role land plays in those stories. Part three looks at
10. DUNCAN & PioOrr, supra note 4, at 25 (citing Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.)).
11. Milward, supra note 6, at 288 ("Aboriginal societies often had strict protocols to
preserve the integrity of their oral histories, and their transmission from generation to
generation.").
12. See infra Part II.B (discussing the features of tribal stories and oral history that can
make it more reliable evidence than a written record).
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the uneasy fit between oral history evidence and the type of evidence
usually presented in court. Part three also discusses the additional
complexities that tribal language and cultural differences bring to a land
claim adjudication. 13 Part four examines the barriers to the introduction of
oral history presented by the best evidence and hearsay rules, and the
adoption by Canadian courts of a "principled exception" to the most serious
of these barriers, the hearsay rule. Included in this discussion is the creative
use by Canadian courts of judicial notice and other evidentiary procedures
to authenticate oral history in aboriginal land claim proceedings when a
written record or first-hand observer is unavailable. This part also identifies
the measures Canadian courts have enacted to authenticate aboriginal oral
history sufficiently to allow its use in court without disrupting the integrity
of the judicial process. The fifth part of this article discusses the
differences between the experience of Canadian courts with aboriginal oral
history and that of courts in the United States.
There is no objective reason why U.S. courts could not take the same
path as Canadian courts. This article concludes that the U.S. has not
adopted the Canadian evidentiary rule due to the federal government's
fluctuating and fickle approach to the "Indian problem."l 4 Unlike Canada,
which has made efforts to address evidentiary barriers with its First Nations
peoples, the United States has only recently entered an era of indigenous
Self-Determination," and the jury is still out on the benefits of this era.
I. Indigenous Peoples and Their Special Relationship to the Land
"Our culture enables us to make sense of our lives and
determines, to a large extent, what lfe choices we make, and
those choices must make sense according to the stories our
culture tells about us."1
13. Geoff Sherrott, The Court's Treatment of Evidence in Delgamuukw v. B.C., 56
SASK. L. REv. 441, 441 (1992)(citing ERIC COLvIN, LEGAL PROCESS AND THE RESOLUTION OF
INDIAN CLAIMS 28 (1981)) (stating that non-tribal judges may be ill-suited to have a cultural
understanding of aboriginal oral history). This might be why U.S. courts resist the
admissibility of oral history. See also Brian J. Gover & Mary Locke Macaulay, "Snow
Houses Leave No Ruins:" Unique Evidence Issues in Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Cases,
60 SASK. L. REv. 47, 48 (1996); id. at 89 (reporting that the trial in the Delgamuukw case
took 374 days and lasted three years, while the Bear Island litigation took 120 days).
14. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 41 (6th
ed. 2011).
15. Id. at 217.
16. Id. at 657.
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To understand indigenous oral history, one needs to understand the
culture, cosmology, mythology, and land relations of that indigenous
group. 7 These factors make indigenous oral history unique to each separate
indigenous group because cultures and mythologies differ among various
indigenous groups. For these reasons, the uniqueness of indigenous oral
history adds doubt to its reliability and utility as evidence in a court
proceeding. It is equally important to know what an indigenous claimant
must prove in order to establish her land claim because the burden of proof
will be affected by the role, or lack thereof, that oral history plays in putting
forth evidence.
A. Aboriginal Peoples and Land
The terms "indigenous peoples" or "aboriginal peoples" generally refers
to "the living descendants or pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now
dominated by others."18 Connection to land is of paramount importance to
indigenous peoples and is coupled with their determination "to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and
their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal
systems."' 9  Land is a "constituent element" of many tribes.2 0  The
centrality of land to indigenous peoples is based on more than the potential
land uses - land also provides tribes the cultural identity and security that
they need to survive. 2 1 The importance of land to many indigenous cultures
distinguishes them from non-indigenous ones.22
17. Id at 649 n.77.
18. Eric Dannenmaier, Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence
of a Distinctive Connection Doctrine, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 53, 58 (2008). This article uses
the terms aboriginal, indigenous, and tribe interchangeably, understanding that each can
have a unique meaning especially in different countries.
19. Id. at 59 (quoting Jost R. MARTINEZ COBO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, FINAL REPORT (1981-86), published as
U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.1-4; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/2/Add.5; U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/ Add.1-6; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6; U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.1-8; and U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7, available at
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/Library/MartC3%ADnezCoboStudy.aspx
(last visited Sept. 10, 2012)).
20. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 655; see also id. at 655-66 ("[T]he indexical value
of land in establishing identity is completely different than the legal value of land inscribed
in deeds. . . . In this way, the law can undermine the foundational significance of land for a
particular culture.").
21. DUNCAN & PIGGOTT, supra note 4, app. E., at 76 ("A tract of land is not just a
hunting blind or a favourite fishing hole. Individual sites such as hunting blinds and fishing
24 [Vol. 37
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Indigenous peoples' relationship to their ancestral land is also imbued
with beliefs about the spirit world.23 For many native peoples, the
landscape "is the source of spiritual origins and sustaining myth which in
turn provides a landscape of cultural and emotional meaning." 24  The
metaphysical dominates an indigenous peoples' relationship to their land.25
This spiritual relationship dictates accepted practices on the lands and
translates into a strong duty to protect that land.26 These practices also
create a special bond between the land and the indigenous group.27 This
"relationship to land is part of the Indian worldview - indigenous people
'often see themselves as 'belonging' to the land or being part of the
land."' 28
While the concept of land ownership and the accompanying
documentation is of critical importance to non-indigenous peoples, it is of
little importance to indigenous peoples. 2 9 Europeans mistakenly thought
that because indigenous peoples did not fence in their land or mimic
European notions of property ownership, land was unimportant to them, as
holes are but a part of the land that has provided 'cultural security and continuity' to
Tsilhqot'in people for better than two centuries. A tract of land is intended to describe land
over which Indigenous people roamed on a regular basis; land that ultimately defined and
sustained them as a people." (quoting Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 B.C.S.C.
1700 (Can.))).
22. Stohr, supra note 2, at 688 ("The second major difference between Native American
and Western religions, and one that has perhaps the largest impact on litigation, is the
importance of land and sacred places").
23. Andie Diane Palmer, Evidence 'Not in a Form Familiar to Common Law Courts':
Assessing Oral Histories in Land Claims Testimony after Delgamuukw v. B.C., 38 ALTA. L.
REv. 1040, 1049 n.36 (2000).
24. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 246, 250 (1989).
25. Caskey Russell, Cultures in Collision: Cosmology, Jurisprudence, and Religion in
Tlingit Territory, 33 AM. INDIAN Q. 230, 240 (2009) ("Tlingit property and jurisprudence ...
are inextricably intertwined with the metaphysical") (quoting Rosita Worl, Tlingit At.oow:
Tangible and Intangible Property (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with Harvard University Library system)).
26. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 10 (1984) ("With respect to the lands they lived
on, many Indians felt a strong religious duty to protect their territory.").
27. DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, at 64.
28. John C. Hoelle, Re-Evaluating Tribal Customs of Land Use Rights, 82 U. COLO. L.
REV. 551, 585 (2011) (quoting Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of
Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economies, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge,
21 VT. L. REv. 225, 284-85 (1996).
29. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 656.
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there was no visible system of land ownership.30 Indeed, indigenous
peoples "live within a place designated for them in the dominant society's
imaginary of them," 3 ' which devalues their connection to the land, even
though land and specific places in the landscape have always been and
remain of paramount importance to them. 3 2 Because Europeans saw no
customary indications of land ownership, they eventually expelled
indigenous peoples from their land33 and destroyed not only specific places
of indigenous importance, but also the very fabric of their relationship to
the land.34 Despite this tortured history, indigenous peoples survived.
B. General Background Information on Indigenous Land Claims and How
They Are Established in Canadian Courts
Indigenous land claims are based on the legal notion of a "right" or title
to the land. Understanding what is entailed in establishing an indigenous
land claim or right to land is important because of oral history's potential
role in those claims.
30. BRUCE CHATWIN, THE SONGLINES 56 (1987) ("White men ... made the common
mistake of assuming that, because Aboriginals were wanderers, they could have no system
of land tenure.").
31. Larry Nesper, Law and Ojibwe Indian "Traditional Cultural Property" in the
Organized Resistance to the Crandon Mine in Wisconsin, 36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 151, 162
(2011).
32. DUNCAN & PIGGOTT, supra note 4, app. D., at 65 ("[A]boriginal title is ultimately
premised upon the notion that the specific land or territory at issue was of central
significance to the aboriginal group's culture. Occupation should therefore be proved by
evidence not of regular and intensive use of the land but of the traditions and culture of the
group that connect it with the land. Thus, intensity of use is related not only to common law
notions of possession but also to the aboriginal perspective.").
33. DUNCAN & PiGGOTr, supra note 4, app. E., at 76 ("As a consequence of colonization
and government policy, Tsilhqot'in people can no longer live on the land as their forefathers
did.").
34. Alexander Reilly, The Ghost of Truganini: Use of Historical Evidence as Proof of
Native Land, 28 FED. L. REv. 453, 459 (2000) [hereinafter Reilly, Ghost of Truganini] ("On
the historical evidence alone, it seemed that the impact of European settlement on the
Aboriginal people of the region was so devastating that it would be very difficult to establish
a continuing traditional connection with the land in its wake.").
35. Id. at 474.
36. Cheryl Suzack, The Transposition of Law and Literature in Delgamuukw and
Monkey Beach, 110 S. ATLANTIC Q. 447, 454 (2011).
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In former Commonwealth countries, the concept of an indigenous land
right or Indian title has its origins in indigenous occupation of land 7 before
any declaration of sovereignty by the British Crown.38  These rights
survived colonial conquest and the colonization of indigenous lands,
"unless such interest has been formally extinguished by legislation." 0
Contrary to U.S. law,41 Canadian courts never viewed North America as
terra nullius, with no pre-existing legal systems prior to European arrival.42
In Canadian courts, indigenous law is "actually law," and imposes an
obligation on the courts to bring "laws that arise from the standards of the
indigenous peoples before the court" into their decision-making process. 43
Unlike U.S. courts, a variety of former Commonwealth courts have ruled
that indigenous land rights are "grounded in their pre-existing customary
laws which have survived colonialism."" Indigenous customs, including
native systems of land tenure,45 are a principle source of indigenous title.4
"[I]ndigenous title 'protects what remains of the unique relationship to
land of the indigenous peoples.'4 7 For example, for a land claim to prevail
in a Canadian court, indigenous plaintiffs must establish that since the time
of Canadian sovereignty, they have: maintained a substantial connection to
the land,48 that the connection is of 'central significance' to their distinctive
37. Under Canadian law, "occupation" includes more than the villages where native
peoples lived; it includes the surrounding, even the remote lands on which they depended for
survival. See DUNCAN & PIGGOTT, supra note 4, app. D., at 64.
38. Jrdmie Gilbert, Historical Indigenous Peoples' Land Claims: A Comparative and
International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine ofIndigenous Title, 56 INT'L & COMP
L.Q. 383, 390 (2007).
39. Id. at 385.
40. Id. at 391, 403 ("[The] concept of aboriginal title is by itself discriminatory as 'it
provides only defective, vulnerable and inferior legal status for indigenous land and resource
ownership'.").
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567-68 (1823).
42. DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, app. D., at 63.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 589-90; see also Hoelle, supra note 28, at 558 ("The
customary law of Indian tribes is not immediately accessible, as it is seldom written down by
Indians themselves.").
45. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 592. It is not always easy to discover this customary law.
46. Id. at 591 ("[T]he existence of indigenous peoples' rights to their land is to be found
in indigenous peoples' own customary laws.").
47. Id. at 597 (quoting Alexander Reilly, The Australian Experience ofAboriginal Title:
Lessons for South Africa, 16 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 512, 515 (2000)).
48. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 597.
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culture,"A9 and that they have engaged in traditional uses of that land.50 A
substantial connection to the land does not require complete continuity of
occupation. 5' "Occasional entry and use," however, is not sufficient. 52
Under the Canadian common law doctrine of indigenous title, the
requirement of "continuity" means that native peoples must still occupy
some portion of their traditional land.5 3 Physical occupation sufficient to
establish title to the land may be shown by regular use of the land in
question, including hunting and fishing or other types of exploitation of the
land's resources.54 However, seasonal use of these lands for hunting and
fishing is insufficient to establish hunting or fishing rights.55
The continuity requirement can create inequities. For example, this
criterion can be difficult for nomadic indigenous peoples to meet5 6 because
ties to a particular geographic area are difficult to establish due to historic
roaming. Additionally, the judicial requirement that indigenous groups
49. DUNCAN & PIGGoTr, supra note 4, app. D. at 57-58 ("If the group has 'maintained a
substantial connection' with the land since sovereignty, this establishes the required 'central
significance."' (quoting Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 151
(Can.))).
50. John Borrows, Frozen Rights in Canada, Constitutional Interpretation and the
Trickster, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 43 (1997) ("Aboriginal rights protect only those
customs which have continuity with practices existing before the arrival of Europeans.
Aboriginal rights do not sustain central and significant Aboriginal practices which developed
solely as a result of their contact with European cultures.").
51. See John McNeil, The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J.
775, 777 (1999) ("Needless to say there is no need to establish an unbroken chain of
continuity between present and prior occupation. The occupation and use of lands may have
been disrupted for a time, perhaps as a result of the unwillingness of European colonizers to
recognize aboriginal title." (citations omitted) (quoting Delagamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at 1103)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 21, at 24 ("To say that title flows from
occasional entry and use is inconsistent with . .. the approach to aboriginal title which this
Court has consistently maintained" (quoting R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
220, para. 59 (Can.))).
53. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 596 ("Under the doctrine on indigenous title, indigenous
peoples' right to their land would be recognized by national jurisdictions to the extent that
indigenous communities have survived dispossession and still live on parts of their lands.").
54. DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, app. D., at 57.
55. Id. at 56.
56. R.D. Lumb, Native Title to Land in Australia: Recent High Court Decisions, 42
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 84, 100 (1993).
57. DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, app. D., at 57, 62, & 74 (suggesting the need to
modify common law understandings of physical occupation being proof of possess to reflect
nomadic or semi-nomadic types of occupation).
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continue to engage in traditional practices on their land, if carried to the
extreme, can freeze indigenous customs and practices,58 requiring tribes to
conform to non-indigenous land practices. Rigidly adhering to the
continuity requirement can create a "false notion of history," 5 and can
diminish tribal authenticity and sovereignty, as tribes are perceived by the
non-indigenous culture as having not "evolved" enough to meet the
continuity standard.o
Modern Canadian courts have tempered the continuity requirement to be
more favorable to indigenous land use practices61 because "imposing the
requirement of continuity too strictly would risk 'perpetuating the historical
injustices suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonisers who
failed to respect aboriginal rights to land."' 6 2 Once evidence of occupation
is established, Canadian courts accept it as "historical fact,"63 thereby
lending more weight to the role of oral history.
58. See Nicholas Buchanan & Eve Darian-Smith, Introduction: Law and the
Problematics of Indigenous Authenticities, 36 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 115, 121 (2011) ("The
process of setting legal criteria, whereby Aboriginal people must prove that their long-
standing hunting, fishing, and spiritual practices create ties to the land, essentializes these
acts as being necessarily traditional and timeless.").
59. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 601-02 (quoting Alexander Reilly & Ann Genovese,
Claiming the Past: Historical Understanding in Australian Native Title Jurisprudence, 3
INDIGENOUS L.J. 19, 38 (2004)).
60. Stephen W. Silliman, Change and Continuity, Practice and Memory: Native
American Persistence in Colonial New England, 74 Am. ANTIQUITY 211, 213 (2009)
("Native American communities continue to be judged by private citizens, government
officials, anthropologists, and the media based on how much they have changed or not
changed, and these judgments directly impact issues of authenticity, sovereignty, land, and
other aspects of their everyday lives."). One concern is that essentializing the relationship of
indigenous cultures to land can "'freez[e] and reify[] an identity in a way that hides the
historical processes and politics within which it develops."' Dannenmaier, supra note 18, at
101 n.283 (alterations in original) (quoting Jean E. Jackson & Kay B. Warren, Indigenous
Movements in Latin America, 1992-2004: Controversies, Ironies, New Directions, 34 ANN.
REv. ANTHROPOLOGY 549, 559 (2005)). Essentializing can negate or mask important and
nuanced characteristics of a tribe's relationship to land, and may also support a stereotyped
view that justify overpowering the "essentialized" people. Id.
61. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 599 ("[Tlhe Canadian legal system has usually
adopted . . . 'some degree of change in the content of an indigenous practice over the period
of time since colonisation does not render that practice ineligible for legal recognition and
protection."' (quoting Anthony Connolly, Judicial Conceptions of Traditional Canadian
Aboriginal Rights Law, 7 ASIA PAC. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 27 (2006))).
62. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 600 (quoting Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3
S.C.R. 50 (Can.)).
63. DUNCAN & PIGGOT, supra note 4, app. E., at 76.
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With a better understanding of indigenous peoples and the importance of
land to them, as well as the requirements of establishing an indigenous land
claim, this article now turns to a discussion of indigenous oral history
preceded by a short exposition of legal storytelling in general.
II. Indigenous Story Telling and Its Importance
Even in captivity, Pintupi mothers, like good mothers
everywhere, tell stories to their children about the origin of
animals ... and as Kipling illustrated the Just So stories with his
own line drawings, so the Aboriginal mother makes drawings in
the sand to illustrate the wanderings of the Dreamtime
heroes. . . . It is through the 'sketches' that the young learn to
orient themselves top their land, its mythology and resources.64
As discussed previously, land plays a dual role for tribes, both as a
source of identification and security. Unless oral history can be used by
tribes to establish a tribal claim to their traditional lands, there may be no
way of assuring that the land will remain in the tribe's domain. In addition,
tribal stories have importance beyond the particular court dispute because
they are critical for tribal identity and governance, so their recognition
might help indigenous peoples in their quest for equality.65
A. Stories in the Law
Stories occupy an important place in the law. Stories offer a space for
litigants to explain "the concrete particulars of their experience in a way
normally excluded by legal reasoning and rule."66 However, "the making,
transmission, and reception of stories is never innocent or
unproblematic ... ; [the process] activates unacknowledged ideologies and
doxa ... [and the] formal design of narratives reflects their intention, their
tendency, their construal and their outcome."6 This is because stories "do
not simply recount happenings; they give them shape, give them a point,
argue their import, [and] proclaim their results."68 Embedded in the nature
64. CHATWIN, supra note 30, at 21-22.
65. Alphine W. Jefferson, Christian W McMillen's Making Indian Law: The Haulapai
Land Case and the Birth of Ethnohistory, 37 ORAL HISTORY REv. 114, 115 (2010) (book
review) ("[Riespect for and value of nontraditional ways of documenting and reading history
can be valuable judicial tools in the Native American struggle for equality.").
66. Peter Brooks, The Narrativity ofLaw, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 1, 1 (2002).
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id at 4.
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of stories is an evidentiary problem - the need to separate truth from
hyperbole.69
Stories require "the law to be accountable to a critique from outside its
hermetic closure; one that insists that legal language and legal business as
usual implicate master narratives, ideologies, and concepts that have a place
in other domains of culture as well, and cannot be insulated and protected
purely as legal terms of art.",70 As a result, stories, particularly the stories of
minorities, struggle for a place in court.7 ' On the other hand, judges use
stereotypes about minorities from stories to influence their judgments.7 2
69. Debora L. Threedy, Claiming the Shields: Law, Anthropology, and the Role of
Storytelling in a NAGPRA Repatriation Case Study, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 91,
113 (2009) ("[J]ust because a story is persuasive does not mean that it is true and,
conversely, a poorly constructed story is not necessarily a false story." (citing W. LANCE
BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE
AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 89 (1981))).
70. Brooks, supra note 66, at 9.
71. Id. at 1 ("[L] iterary narratologists ... have long argued that narrative is one of the
large categories in which we order and construct reality. But I think that they remain
heretical within the world of the law, which does not overtly recognize 'narrative' as a
category in the process of legal adjudication."). On the topic of judicial response to stories
told by individuals without power, see Peter Brooks, The Narrativity of Law, 14 LAw &
LITERATURE 1, 10 (2002) ("At its most potent, the 'law and literature movement' summons
the law to be accountable to a critique from outside its hermetic closure, one that insists that
legal language and legal business as usual implicate master narratives, ideologies, and
concepts that have a place in other domains of culture as well, and cannot be insulated and
protected purely as legal terms of art."); Jamie G. Longazel, Laurin S. Parker, & Ivan Y.
Sun, Experiencing Courts, Experiencing Race: Perceived Procedural Injustices Among
Court Users, 1 RACE & JUST. 219 (2011) ("African Americans in particular often walk away
from their court experience with far more negative attitudes than their White and
Latina/Latino counterparts but also to understand such differences as being the result of the
lived experience of race in the courtroom. Second, our study suggests the importance of
privileging experiential knowledge. People of color have valuable stories to tell about their
distinct experiences (i.e., Williams, 1991). Granted, we were unable to grasp the full value of
such stories given the methodology we employed, but we were able to uncover what we feel
is an important evidence of how minority groups differently experience an otherwise neutral
institution by taking respondents at their word for what they perceived as unfair treatment.").
72. Supra note 66, at 4. ("Often, one detects, what's at issue is a judge's sense of how a
woman is supposed to behave in certain circumstances: a set of unexamined cultural doxa
(as Roland Barthes would have said) that undergird our everyday construal of narratives.");
See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2229-30
(2000-2001) (remarking that racialized narratives or treatment "might be unrecognizable to a
lawyer not trained to look for them"); and id. at 2274 (arguing that the analysis of white
racialized narratives and their embedded notions of privilege and superiority illuminates the
meaning of color blindness and merit in law and lawyering).
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B. Tribal Stories and Oral History
Oral history is composed of individual, family, or group stories that
orient the storyteller and her audience in a place and a time, often before the
storyteller is born.73 In the case of indigenous peoples, oral history includes
songs,74 rituals, and ceremonies as well as artifacts like totems,
weavings,7 pottery,77 or even houses78 that recount that history.79  These
tangible and intangible properties are teaching tools for tribal members80
and comprise a clan's laws, especially its rules about property ownership.'
Like land, tribal stories are essential for self-identification and
governing. 82 They are a source of norms, cultural values, and moral
73. Val Napoleon, Delgamuukw: A Legal Straight-Jacket for Oral Histories?, 20 CAN.
J.L. & Soc'Y 123, 152 (2005).
74. Palmer, supra note 23, at 1043 ("This [social] group [referring to the head of an
aboriginal house group] is corporate and extends through an oral history that is marked by
song, stories, and witness, and is acknowledged through the remembrance and mindful
pronouncement of that same name by others.").
75. Carolyn Smyly, Anthony Island Totems: The Last Big Stand, 101 CANADIAN
GEOGRAPHIC 26, 27 (1981) ("Such is the tenacity of folk myth that it is necessary still to
point out that totem poles were never 'heathen idols' worshipped by the Indians. They were
large genealogical representations, that is, huge family crests, and were erected with great
ceremony to honour the dead and sometimes the living members of a family.").
76. Russell, supra note 25, at 236 ("[T]he history of how each clan came to possess
their land was also written in each text[and] the fabric of the ceremonial blankets and
clothes.").
77. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Anasazi Jurisprudence, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 393, 410-11
(1997).
78. Palmer, supra note 23, at 1044 ("The most significant evidence of spiritual
connection between the Houses and their territory was a feast hall where the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en people tell and re-tell their stories and identify their territories to remind
themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their lands." (quoting Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, paras. 13-14)).
79. Suzack, supra note 36, at 453 ("To establish their historical use and ownership, the
appellants entered evidence in the form of totem poles with the Houses distinctive crests,
regalia, sacred oral traditions about their ancestors, histories, and territories, and spiritual
songs, dances, and performances as proof of ties to their land." (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 13)).
80. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of
Conquest, 22 BOSTON COLL. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 55, 76 (1977) ("Songs are also used as
teaching tools.").
81. Russell, supra note 25, at 238 ("The highly elaborate art of the Tlingits is not merely
aesthetic; it is an elaborate semiotic system that legitimizes claims of clan hereditary and
both tangible and intangible property ownership.").
82. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: The Stories of Modern Indian People
and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATrLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter
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principles, where ties to a particular part of the landscape are crucial for
their legitimacy.83 "Pre-contact Indian community governance provided
social control through a complex arrangement of interconnected
relationships dependent on storytelling and mythmaking." 8 4 Elders passed
down mores and other community behavioral norms to younger community
members through the telling of stories.85  The authority of their ancestors
gives these stories credibility.86 Because tribal stories assist in self-
definition, they are critical to a tribe's survival as a separate people from
their colonizers.8 Deprived of their stories, Indian cultures - and Indians
88
as separate peoples - may disappear.
The narrator of a tribal story is someone who occupies a special place in
the family or group due to age or some form of investiture. 89 The narrator's
function is to pass the story along to the next generation and to the next
storyteller.90 The repetition of stories is critical to the maintenance and
credibility of their content and is an efficient way of transmitting critical
92information. 91 Since written language was rare, the only way to preserve
tribal laws was to orally transmit them to the next generation.93 "In a world
without books or electronic media, oral tradition represented the most
Fletcher, Looking to the East] ("Tribal law and culture are collections of stories. The same
stories that scholars study as snapshots of tribal culture are also stories about a tribe's law.").
83. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Perfect Copy: Indian Culture and Tribal Law, 2
YELLOW MED. REv. 95, 100 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Perfect Copy] ("Many
indigenous laws and norms were incorporated into the languages and stories of Indian
communities. Stories and rules had meaning and relevance to Indian people as long as they
were tied to a particular territory.").
84. Fletcher, Looking to the East, supra note 82, at 5.
85. Fisher, supra note 1, at 13 ("Elderly women in particular played an important role in
educating the young people. Grandmothers told their children and grandchildren the stories
that instilled proper behavior and preserved family and tribal history.").
86. Id. at 14-15.
87. Russell, supra note 25, at 244.
88. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 657.
89. Fisher, supra note 1, at 13 ("The patrilineal descent of Plateau chieftainships
enabled the signers' male kin to inherit this special status and its attendant responsibilities.").
90. See Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 403.
91. Furniss, supra note 8, at 198.
92. Fisher, supra note 1, at 12 (citing WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE
TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 2 (Routledge 2002) (1982)).
93. Id. at 13 ("The only way [my grandfather] could carry out the laws was by repeating
them to his children and it was handed down from time. These people had a memory that
was developed to the extent they had to remember these things.").
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important way of communicating knowledge from generation to
generation." 94
Land has an important place in indigenous stories.95 Often these stories
are tied to a community's traditional territory, such as certain landmarks,9 6
revealing such a strong connection to the land that one could say they are in
fact "imprinted on the land."9 An example of land imprinting is totems. In
the northwest, totems demarcated clan boundaries.98 Intangible properties,
like songs and names, further delineated clan ownership claims to certain
properties.99 Thus, the oral histories and the stories they contain can play
an important role in establishing the essential fact of occupationloo in an
indigenous land claim. The participants in the oral histories recognize these
stories as "providing an authoritative record of past events."'o'
Indigenous stories also provide origin, including the tribe's cosmology,
and explain why a particular tribe would be tied to a particular place in the
universe - a specific geographic spot. 0 2  The stories are generally
nonlinear, not separating past from present, but rather flowing through the
present, unlike non-indigenous history. 0 3  Gods, mythic contacts with
them, and symbols occupy important places in the cosmology of indigenous
peoples and hence in their stories.
94. Id. at 12-13.
95. Fletcher, Looking to the East, supra note 82, at 5 n.26 ("[O]ral narratives have the
power to establish enduring bonds between individuals and features of the natural landscape
and that as a direct consequence of such bonds, persons who have acted improperly will be
moved to reflect critically on their misconduct and resolve to improve it." (quoting KEITH H.
BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE
40 (1996))).
96. Id. at 5.
97. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468 ("Oral histories are imprinted on
the landscape. They require 'travelling through country' to read them. Stories maintain
their life through their connection to the land.").
98. Russell, supra note 25, at 236 ("This is not to say that the carvings represented some
sort of atlas in the Western sense, but that they served as an extension of the oral tradition,
which, as such, demarcated clan boundaries.").
99. Id at 239.
100. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 152.
101. Palmer, supra note 23, at 1045 ("One of the fundamental features of orals
histories.. . is that it is acknowledged by the participants as providing an authoritative
record of past events.").
102. Nesper, supra note 31, at 163.
103. See Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468 ("[Wjritten histories separate
the past and the present, oral histories assume and maintain a conjunction between the past
and the present.").
104. Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 422.
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The "truth" of the facts recounted in these stories are less important than
the purpose behind the story itself and the basic moral and/or cultural
lessons they convey.'05 Those basic lessons remain unadulterated even
though the particular facts of the story may fluctuate to accommodate a
particular storyteller's proclivities and environment.'0 6  Attempts to
corroborate the factual basis of these stories with written, environmental, or
geological records would therefore have "mixed results."'
07
For the reasons above, oral histories are the antithesis of written
histories, and are often demeaned as coming from primitive, uncivilized
societies. 08 But oral histories are not the precursors of written histories, or
even a means of filling a gap when written history is incomplete. 0 9 They
occupy their own important place in reconstructing and reinvigorating the
past,'' 0 and may "evoke recollections and understandings that were
previously silenced or ignored.""' They may also be the only proof that
indigenous groups have to establish their claim to a particular plot of land
that holds significance to them.112 Further, because their claims arose before
there was any written history to document them, any written history on
record would unilaterally reflect the biases of the particular historian
105. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468.
106. Id. ("Events in the past are shifting and amenable to intervention and so can be used
as a way of reaffirming or even changing the present. The past is open to regular
interrogation." (quoting BAIN ATwOOD, THE MAKING OF THE ABORIGINES (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
107. Stohr, supra note 2, at 687.
108. Id. at 683. The practice of tribal oral history is seen as primitive, and was reflected
in the U.S. Supreme Court's adoption of the Indian canons of treaty construction. Id at 689.
109. Id. at 687 ("Oral traditions have a part to play in the reconstruction of the past. . . .
But the relationship is not . . . [that] when writing fails, tradition comes on stage. This is
wrong. Wherever oral traditions are extant, they remain an indispensable source for
reconstruction." (quoting JAN VINSINA, ORAL TRADITION As HISTORY 199 (1985))).
110. See Alistair Thomson, Fifty Years On: An International Perspective on Oral
History, 85 J. AM. HIST. 586 (1998) ("If memory were treated as an object of historical
analysis, oral history could be 'a powerful tool for discovering, exploring, and evaluating the
nature of the process of historical memory- how people make sense of their past, how they
connect individual experience and its social context, how the past becomes part of the
present, and how people use it to interpret their lives and the world around them."' (quoting
MICHAEL FRISCH, A SHARED AUTHORITY: ESSAYS ON THE CRAFT AND MEANING OF ORAL AND
PUBLIC HISTORY 10, 188 (1990))).
111. Id. at584.
112. 0. W. MacLaren, M. Barry & K. Sangster, Tsilhquot'in Nation v. British Columbia,
43 SURVEY REV. 123, 126 (2011).
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recording it and could contain translation errors.' 13  Indeed, when law
ignores indigenous oral history, it is the history of native peoples that is
excluded,'l 4 which is a potential violation of international norms."'
III. The Intersection of Indigenous Oral History and Courts
How can one accept or prove this when the formulators and
adherents of the jurisprudence left no written guide?116
The fit between indigenous oral history and judicial procedures is
uncomfortable in part because court procedures, judicial rules, and the legal
idiom do not create room for story telling in general, and are particularly
unreceptive to the fictive elements of native stories. When faced with court
rules and legal terminology, the indigenous story changes into something
quite different, potentially unrecognizable to the storyteller and less useful
as evidence. Additionally, there are differences between the purpose of
tribal stories and judicial evidence, cultural differences between the
indigenous storyteller and the judge, uncertainties about the evidentiary
value of these stories, and finally the contrarian nature of the stories. These
difficulties are discussed in this part of the article.
A. Why Native Peoples Do Not Fit the Judicial Paradigm Easily
There are several ways in which the legal system as a whole
disadvantages Native peoples. First, law is not a neutral force; it both
shapes and reflects social norms and constructs.1 7 Law is "the tool used to
define and interpret the meaning of specific events," even though it has
113. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 67-68 (noting that recordings of oral history
were done in a very "cursory fashion and from poorly identified sources," and some of them
were "heavily influenced by White historical narratives, missionary propaganda, and even
anthropological publications.").
114. See Suzack, supra note 36, at 452 ("[A]boriginal communities bear the costs of
judicial invention in its elision of the past.").
115. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 395 ("HRC [Human Rights Commission] has shown that
past wrongs could constitute a continuous violation of the contemporary rights enjoyed by
indigenous peoples under the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]."
(citing Simunek, Hasting, Tuzilova, and Prochazka v. Czech Republic, Communication No.
516/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995))).
116. Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 403.
117. Suzack, supra note 36, at 451 ("[T]heorization of law as 'an authoritative form
through which social values are articulated and regularized and thus become part of the
'common sense' of the age and culture,' and as a social force constraining of culture through
its capacity for transpositioning social objects and actors." (quoting Alan Hunt, Rights and
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & Soc. 316 (1990))).
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great difficulty accommodating "irreconcilable cultural perspectives."' 18
Law is part of the state's hegemony.ll 9 As such, it is an "artifact" of both
culture and power and can limit a peoples' cultural vision to that of the
dominant culture.120 The legal idiom can favor the version of a story told by
the people in power over that of the less powerful.121 Judicial norms and
procedures can erase historical complexities in order to fit the procedural
structure of a case and, in the process, reinvent social meanings and
understandings. 122
These inherent judgments also involve misconstruing Native peoples, as
"law creates and involves flattened images of what Native people do and do
not do. Often this legal essentialization takes the form of Native peoples
being marked as opposite to the dominant culture - spatially, temporally,
and perceptually removed from the majority of the population living in
cities and urban centers." 2 3
Second, legal rules, particularly the rules of evidence, control "the
substantive demonstration of the issues in dispute and by the authoritative
use of previously decided cases." 24 These rules favor stories that can be
scientifically and objectively proven over ones that cannot be, 12 5 and often
create a strong bias in favor of the written record. 126
Oral accounts are often considered to be subjective in
comparison to written records' assumed objectivity and the
118. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 631.
119. Suzack, supra note 36, at 451.
120. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 631-32.
121. Id. at 630.
122. Suzack, supra note 36, at 452-53 ("[Llegal discourse has a profound capacity for the
incorporation and reinvention of social meanings and for the erasure of the discursive
complexity of the historical past.").
123. Buchanan & Darian-Smith, supra note 58, at 121.
124. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 642 (noting how Torres is particularly critical of
how claims are proved in an indigenous land claim dispute).
125. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 681 ("Literacy permeates Western culture. With few
exceptions, government, science, religion and entertainment all are centered around the
written word. . . . The jurisprudence [likewise] reflects a certain entrenched cultural
predisposition to trust only that which is documented or documentable ('scientific') and to
distrust that which is not ('intuitive,' 'irrational')." (alterations in original) (quoting Verna C.
Sanchez, All Roads Are Good: Beyond the Lexicon of Christianity in Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 59-60 (1997))).
126. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 632 ("By distinguishing a pre-literate from a
post-literate phase in the life of the Mashpee . . . the court devalued the oral history of the
Mashpee where it conflicted with written documents, even though those documents did not
reflect the understandings ofthe Mashpee at the time the documents were created.").
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spoken word is understood as being susceptible to modification
over time as it is retold from one person to another... In
comparison, the written word tends to become immutable once
recorded, less vulnerable to change and strengthened each time it
is relied upon as authority.12 7
Just as legal norms can disadvantage Native peoples, so too can judicial
rules. Professor Torres' description of the Mashpee trial shows how the
court systematically favored the written record over the Mashpee's oral
history and in the process silenced them.12 8 "[B]ecause the Mashpee Indian
culture is rooted in large measure on the passing of an oral record, their
history could only signify silence.,l 29 Yet there can be problems with the
written record. The written record can contain factual errors and "mistaken
depictions of the past,"l30 can be "culturally limited, and informed by a
narrow knowledge base." 3 ' "Ethnocentric biases, imprecision" about
geographic locations, changes in "nomenclature" over time, and a lack of
records from older periods can seriously undermine the accuracy of written
records as well.132
Third, judges have great discretion in applying the law. They are the
gatekeepers for how an indigenous land claim is presented to the court, and
whether it is presented at all. Judges determine how the back-story of an
indigenous claim will be portrayed through admissions of evidence, which
witnesses get to tell that story, and which stories carry the greatest
probative weight.' 3 3 Thus, a judge's determination of the facts relevant to
establishing the legal claims controls the story that the plaintiffs can tell.134
In indigenous land claim cases, "there are no generally applicable facts,"
which makes the court's job more difficult.' 35 For a fact to be relevant to a
judge, it must sound in precedent, which comprises of "the stories deemed
127. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468-69 (quoting Merkel, J., in
Commonwealth v Yarmirr).
128. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 649 n.78.
129. Id. at 649.
130. Milward, supra note 6, at 288.
131. Id. at 304.
132. Id. at 305; see also Lori Ann Roness & Kent McNeil, Legalizing Oral History:
Proving Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courts, 39 J. WEST 66, 67 (2000) ("However,
where written records do exist, they often do not contain adequate information on Aboriginal
use and occupation of land and tend to be tainted by the European perspective of the persons
who produced them.").
133. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 465.
134. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 630-31 (describing this process as a "game").
135. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 48.
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acceptable by previous courts."l36 Precedent is important as it both
establishes "the outer limits of a particular legal pronouncement" and the
"foundation for subsequent interpretations of those limits."' 3 7  The
examples that are in precedent and cited authority, however, are not neutral
and do not arise "naturally,"l 38 and the story that emerges is far from a
"classic narrative." 39
When indigenous land claims reach court they are "translated by means
of examples that the law can follow - precedent, and examples that law
can hear - evidence."l 4 0 This "legal coding," through which translation
occurs, "highlights ... the confrontation between irreconcilable systems of
meaning produced by two contending cultures . . . [which strips away]
nuances of meaning . . . [and] elevates a particular version of events to a
non-contingent status."'41 When the normative bias of the law, (including
the vernacular of the law), judicial procedures, and the judge's discretion
transform the tribe's story into a story a court can hear, this often
fundamentally changes the story to a point where it may be unrecognizable
to the storyteller.14 2 For example, Professor Torres describes the Mashpee
trial as allowing "no room for divergent cultural understandings, even the
Mashpee's self-understanding." 43 Thus, in order to bring a land claim, a
tribe may be required to sacrifice their storytelling perspective to fit the
required legal mold.
B. What Makes Indigenous Oral History Particularly Problematic for a
Judge
As previously shown, indigenous oral history presents unique challenges
for judges when it is proffered as proof of some historical fact.'" Its
provenance is frequently hazy; its origins and the chain of storytellers are
136. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 647.
137. Id. at 642.
13 8. Id.
139. Id. at 646 ("The process of legal storytelling and relevance determination is more
like a gathering of material for an index than the telling of a classic narrative. Facts are
assembled to tell a story whose conclusion is determined by others.").
140. Id. at 628.
141. Id. at 628-30; see also DUNcAN & PiGGoTr, supra note 4, at 25.
142. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 628.
143. Id. at 631, 658 (explaining that the concept of a land claim is completely foreign to
most Indian cultures; it is a legal construct tribes must adopt to protect their traditional
interests in their land).
144. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 680 (listing the challenges Native Americans face).
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often unknown and shrouded in mystery.14 5  Because of mythological
references and unverifiable facts, oral histories cannot be easily
confirmed.14 6 As with written history, the stories and artifacts that compose
oral history are self-serving.14 7 As opposed to oral histories, however,
written histories welcome challenge from critics whose scholarship is based
on questioning the validity of the record and introducing a new historical
vision. 148 With oral history, there is no audience who will challenge the
content 4 9 because time has destroyed many of the artifacts that might
confirm the oral history, 50 and the loss of native language skills has
reduced the number of living story tellers who can repeat the stories and
provide the remnants of their origin.'5' Memory is a frail thing, and critical
elements of a story may be lost along the way or may be unverifiable
because the storyteller has forgotten where the story came from. 5 2 Another
problem may be that the story is incomplete because the responsibility for
telling the story is divided among groups within the same tribe.'53
145. See Napoleon, supra note 73, at 149 (reporting on the Court's struggles with oral
history).
146. Milward, supra note 6, at 289-90 (suggesting that courts use an "independent expert
witness" who can work "in an environment that stresses open and cooperative dialogue with
the Aboriginal oral historians as a way "to present a reasonably ascertainable truth to the
court.").
147. Stohr, supra note 2, at 687.
148. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 54 ("[H]istorical facts are always open to
dispute and revision and history is frequently being rewritten. Testimony in litigation, on the
other hand, once admitted into evidence and interpreted by a court, becomes fixed inter-
parties even though the same evidence out of the context of the litigation could, as an
intellectual exercise, be given a different interpretation by subsequent scholars or upon other
facts emerging to change the context. . .
149. Id.
150. See generally Smyly, supra note 75 (discussing the destruction of Anthony Island
totems).
151. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 16 ("English literacy, language loss and the passing of
older generations has caused many traditions to atrophy in the twentieth century . .. Despite
a decline in the number of proficient performers. Native oral traditions endure within
traditional circles. Yakama treaty rights have partially merged with a literate legal tradition,
but the promised made in 1855 have neither faded from memory nor lost their significance
to the Yakama Nation.").
152. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 654 ("Recorded memory relies less on the
memory of the teller.").
153. Justin B. Richland, Hopi Tradition as Jurisdiction: On the Potentializing Limits of
Hopi Sovereignty, 36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 201, 230 (2011).
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At a macro level, there is a fundamental difference between the function
of a tribe's stories and of court procedures.15 4 There are also significant
cultural differences between the Indian storyteller and her non-Indian
audience, in this case a judge.'"5 Then there are uncertainties over the
reliability of tribal stories because they are passed forward through
generations and frequently altered to reflect changes in circumstances and
changes with the perspective of the storyteller.156  Last, these stories
challenge the status quo,'5 7 and force the dominant culture to question its
justifications for legal and socio-economic power.'58 These problems are
extremely evident in land claim disputes. This makes oral history evidence
particularly difficult for judges to admit and determine how much weight to
give it.159 Each of these problems is developed in more detail below.
1. Different Roles of Courts and Indigenous Story Tellers
Indigenous oral history is problematic for a judge because it is imbued
with mythology, unlike admissible evidence. Indians tell stories to self-
identify, explain their origin, and to locate themselves in a particular
cosmology, often in a specific geographic location.160 An Indian's view of
their cosmology is quite different from that of a non-Indian - specifically
154. See Dwight G. Newman, Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia and Civil Justice:
Analyzing the Procedural Interaction ofEvidentiary Principles and aboriginal Oral History,
43 ALTA. L. REv. 433, 434 (2005) ("How is the use of oral history as part of the aspirations
toward justice for Aboriginal peoples reconciled with the practical needs of a civil justice
system? How do judges operationalize this law through the common law development of
appropriate civil procedure in relation to the admission of such evidence?").
155. Palmer, supra note 23, at 1049.
156. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 66-67 ("Oral tradition ... can be adapted to
changed conditions without anyone being aware that a departure from precedent has been
made. Unwritten custom 'quietly passes over obsolete laws, which sink into oblivion, and
die peacefully, but the law itself remains young, always in the belief that it is old."'
(emphasis added)).
157. DUNCAN & PIGGOTT, supra note 4, at 12.
158. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 151 ("[T]he S.C.C. wrote that accommodation of
unique aboriginal evidence must not strain the Canadian legal and constitutional structure.
Borrows suggests that aboriginal oral histories will very likely strain the Canadian legal and
constitutional structure because (1) owing to the illegality and/or unconstitutionality of past
actions, oral histories can potentially undermine the law's claim to legitimacy, and (2) oral
histories effectively assert an alternative structure of legitimate normative order.").
159. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 453-54.
160. See Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 406 ("The origin myths of the historic and
contemporary Pueblos, emanating out of their Anasazi past, described the emergence of the
people from a life in the underworld out to an existence on the surface.").
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given the important role spirits and myth play.'6' Objective or factual proof
in indigenous stories is unimportant, as the story is intended to teach moral
and cultural lessons through allegory and symbols.16 2 It is unimportant to a
tribal storyteller if the contents surrounding the story stay the same as long
as its purpose - to reassert some moral, spiritual, or cultural truth -
remains the same. 163 Regardless of the passage of time, a change in
storyteller, or surrounding circumstances, these truths remain inviolate.'6
A judge's role with respect to the admissibility of evidence is inapposite
to the role of a storyteller. The judge must find "objective truth" based on
the unimpeachable nature of the supporting facts, even though that very
process may be distorted by cultural and socioeconomic differences.16 The
judge is not a mediator between contrasting cultures and claims, 66 yet this
is the role the judge must often assume in indigenous land claims cases.167
The peculiar nature of indigenous oral history additionally requires a court
to "sift" through myths and spiritual matters in search of these
demonstrable facts.'6 8 "Evidence in which legend, mythology, politics and
morality are interwoven are ill-suited for the positivist of scientific analysis
characteristically employed by the court in which the aim of determining
objective truth is pursued."' 69 Legal evidence and indigenous storytelling
are therefore at odds with one another.
2. Cultural Differences
Cultural differences are also problematic for a judge faced with the
admission of oral history into evidence. The significant cultural differences
161. Russell, supra note 25, at 230 ("Beyond the physical collision of two different
peoples there is also a metaphysical collision between differing cultural modes for
apprehending reality, for determining truth, and for understanding one's relationship within
physical and spiritual environments.").
162. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 80, at 76 ("Navajo norms, values and moral
principles are stated in the Navajo language and preserved in Navajo creation scripture,
origin stories, ceremonies, songs, stories and maxims.").
163. Newman, supra note 154, at 448.
164. See SALLY McBETH, NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL
INTERPRETATION IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK 32 (2007), available at http://www.
cr.nps.gov/history/online-books/romo/mcbeth/oral-history.pdf
165. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 472.
166. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 631.
167. DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, app. E., at 76.
168. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 68.
169. MacLaren, Barry & Sangster, supra note 112, at 127 (discussing Tsilhquot'in
decision).
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between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples 17 0  make translation of
indigenous oral history into legal vernacular difficult.17' "The law[,] as
presently structured[,] allows no clear way to achieve" symbiosis between
these polar opposites.17 2 This difficulty in translation between two vastly
different approaches to evidence "renders unreadable the entire code of
which [tribes] are a part, while simultaneously legitimizing the resulting
ignorance."
Indigenous stories invoke a world and a cosmology filled with spirits and
mythical creatures that are completely foreign to the western secular
thought, which emphasizes scientifically proven fact.174 Even with respect
to the spiritual realm, the Western cosmologies could not be more different
from indigenous ones.175 Stories occupy a space that is completely foreign
to most non-Indians. 17 6 These stories are largely unintelligible to the
western ear, including the ears of a judge faced with authenticating their use
in a land claim dispute. 7 7 Judges are ill equipped to hear the story from the
perspective and worldview of the indigenous storyteller,178 and the legal
system is poorly constructed to receive it.'79  Judges cannot comprehend
170. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 5 ("Native Americans merely understood their treaties
differently, in ways that made sense to them. As the Yakima case suggests, Indian
interpretations arose from a combination of specific cultural characteristics and the general
traits of primary orality.").
171. Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 658 ("In fact, the reality of Indian life is, in a real
sense, untranslatable.").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 629.
174. See Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 397.
175. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 695 ("One feature of oral religions that troubles and
confuses non-Natives is that these religions are tribal, as opposed to universal or world,
religions. There is no drive to missionize or convert those outside the group. In fact, among
many Native American groups-and other oral cultures divulging sacred knowledge to a non-
tribal member may present grave spiritual dangers.").
176. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 649 ("The commonplace view, replicated in
the process of legal proof, is that 'facts' only have meaning to the extent that they represent
something 'real.' The stories that members of the Mashpee Tribe told were stories that legal
ears could not hear. Thus the legal requirements of relevance rendered the Indian
storytellers mute and the culture they were portraying invisible.").
177. See Palmer, supra note 23, at 1050 ("Perhaps, in the study of law in Canada, we
should become increasingly mindful of accounts situated within legal frameworks which
have origins independent of the common law tradition developed under the influence of a
lineage of British sovereigns that has extended into Canadian courts.").
178. Id. at 1047 (suggesting that efforts be made to educate the public at large and judges
in particular in the ways of orally based traditions).
179. Stohr, supra note 2, at 693-94, 700.
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these images and stories when court procedures and rules are inhospitable
to them; therefore, their significance and any possible utility they might
have to a judge is lost.s 0
3. Uncertainties About the Reliability ofIndigenous Stories
A court's primary concern with indigenous oral history is its
reliability.18' Many features of indigenous oral history undermine its
reliability and hence its usefulness in a court proceeding.182 For example,
storytellers change as time passes, as well as the audience for the story, so
courts cannot rely on a listener's affirmation of the truth of the facts
asserted in the story.'8 3  Indeed, the tribe itself may be changing and
evolving in response to external and internal cultural pressures.18 4 Places
mentioned in a story may gain greater cultural significance as threats to
them increase. 185 Stories can be "reworked" by different storytellers. 8 6 "It
is well known that, simply by repetition, stories and information are
distorted to some degree [and] oral history . . . may have been distorted or
indeed lost because of changes and events . . . . Memory can
"deteriorate," 88 be self-selecting,1 8 9 and self-serving. 190 Additionally, the
description of places and events may change or be too vague for any
audience - Indian or non-Indian - to affirm objectively.19'
180. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 629 ("When particular versions of events are
rendered unintelligible, the corresponding counter-examples that those versions represent
lose their legitimacy. Those examples come unglued from both the cultural structure that
grounds them and the legal structure that validate them.").
181. Stohr, supra note 2, at 686-87.
182. Milward, supra note 6, at 296.
183. Id.; cf Jane McMillan, Colonial Traditions, Co-optations, and Mi'kmaq Legal
Consciousness, 36 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 171, 194 (2011).
184. See Russell, supra note 25, at 250 ("[A] living culture must go to the grindstone
again and again and be resharpened rather than remain bright and shiny, dull and well-oiled,
but sitting unused in a closet or . .. in a museum. An unused culture is a dead culture.")
185. Nesper, supra note 31, at 162 ("Not unlike the Black Hills for the Lakota . . . the
local geography has been growing more sacred over the decades as it is threatened by
external forces.").
186. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 67 (quoting Mathias v. Canada, 2000 CANLII
16282, para. 37 (Fed. Ct.)).
187. Milward, supra note 6, at 297.
188. Thomson, supra note 111, at 584.
189. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 135.
190. Id. at 153 (statement of Mr. Goldie).
191. See Nesper, supra note 31, at 165 (statement of interviewee) ("You don't keep track
of a way of life."); Ragsdale, supra note 77, at 396 ("Preliminary problems with a
reconstruction of an ancient jurisprudence include those of definition and probative
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However, none of this necessarily makes the story any less reliable, it
just means that the indigenous group's view of history and historical
accuracy is different than that of a non-indigenous group. 192 History is
considered by the indigenous to be "the reconstruction of (or a perspective
on) an imagined past."' 93
Therefore, historical events, whether recounted in writing or orally,
typically contain contested truths' 94 and rarely conform to the neat patterns
that the presentation of legal claims requires.195 Far from being tidy, both
written and oral history are messy and discordant. Both are informed by the
predilections of the historian, 96 reliant on memory, and "textual" in nature,
although oral history may be "'encoded in places' that are not as obvious as
the printed word." 97 Unfortunately, while historians may understand that
their job is to be skeptical about various recollections of historical truths,198
judges sitting on land claim disputes involving indigenous peoples are not
skeptical and receive written historical text as though it was incapable of
being biased.' 99
The presence of secret information in some indigenous stories can also
lead to questions about its reliability. For tribes, the telling of this secret
information will lessen the story's power and perhaps the power of the tribe
to which it belongs. 20 0  Tribes with these stories are reluctant to repeat
evidence. Such problems are compounded by a preliterate silence and by the Anasazi
withdrawal nearly 700 years ago.").
192. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468 ("As such, it is not surprising to
find ... contradictions in oral accounts of the past. These do not necessarily indicate a lack
of reliability in the account, but that it is a product of a different understanding of history.").
193. Id. at 457.
194. Id. at 465 ("The courts occasionally take notice of historical events as if they were
uncontestable truths.").
195. Id. at 467 ("The law is attracted to historical evidence because of its appearance of
objectivity, its neatness and its simplicity. It appears to provide a concrete connection to the
past, in contrast to oral testimony, which relies on memory.").
196. Id. at 471 ("[H]istorians understand all history to be a construction informed by the
author of an historical document, and therefore there is no clear distinction between real
history and social history. Following from this proposition, there is an important process of
uncovering or acknowledging the contingent and contextual nature of historical facts,
however they are categorised.").
197. Id. at 468.
198. See Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 52-53.
199. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 472.
200. Threedy, supra note 69, at 116; see also Buchanan & Darian-Smith, supra note 58,
at 121 ("[Australian] aboriginal peoples have at times been forced into a position whereby
they must reveal sacred knowledge in order to show long-standing affiliation with land or
objects. Such knowledge is typically held very secretly, passed down orally by women to
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them, let alone introduce them in court as proof of their place-based claim
for fear of sacrificing the place's sacredness. 20 1 Forcing tribes to reveal
sacred information to conform to judicial requirements may "compromise
elements of their cultural identity and religious beliefs."20 2 A tribe's need
for secrecy can clash with the economic interests of an affected landowner
and the cultural norms of the dominant society, revealing a deep divide in
cultural mores.203 The existence of secret information is "a great stumbling
block for Native American litigants, aggravating courts and raising their
suspicions of fraud or ignorance." 20
4. Stories of the Dispossessed
A final factor that makes indigenous oral history problematic is that its
admission forces the majority culture to recognize the stories of its
dispossessed peoples. 205 Empowering culturally repressed peoples like
Indians to tell their stories in court to regain land that has been taken from
them threatens the established political, social, and economic order. These
stories could destabilize vested interests206 and put in place a new order that
women and men to men, and is integral to complex intergeneration social relations....
[O]nce oral knowledge is given as evidence, it becomes written text, available to be read by
Native peoples and non-Native peoples alike.").
201. Threedy, supra note 69, at 117 ("The idea that to obtain the protection promised by
the government for sacred sites the claimants had to violate the sacredness of the site can be
criticized as creating a Hobson's choice: maintain the secrecy of the sacred knowledge
associated with the site and lose the protection of the site itself, or protect the site by
disclosing the secret knowledge that makes the site sacred, thereby profaning the sacred. At
best, what this conundrum reveals is incommensurability between Western law and
indigenous law. The legal system is unable to accept indigenous truth claims on their own
terms, without restructuring them according to legal narrative conventions."). Threedy
reports that the Australian courts have found a way around this dilemma by adopting specific
protocols to deal with it.
202. Buchanan & Darian-Smith, supra note 58, at 121.
203. Robert van Krieken, Kumarangk (Hindmarsh Island) and the Politics of Natural
Justice Under Settler-Colonialism, 36 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 125, 129-30 (2011).
204. Stohr, supra note 2, at 689.
205. See Furniss, supra note 8, at 199 ("Narrative . . . 'is not merely a neutral discursive
form . . . but rather entails ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and
even specifically political implications.').
206. Id at 12 ("Pursuant to the decision in Delgamuukw, provincial fee simple grants
cannot extinguish Aboriginal title. Therefore, where a court finds existing Aboriginal title to
privately held lands, that Aboriginal title should continue to exist as a burden on the fee
simple and potential underlying Crown title (keeping in mind that the Crown can expropriate
fee simple land).").
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might be completely alien to the majority's culture and accepted truths.207
Recognizing indigenous land title, which is a communal title,208 also
threatens the surrounding sovereign state.2 0 9  Indigenous land claims are
seen by some as purely "a political enterprise."210 Courts try to avoid
political issueS211 and are reluctant to acknowledge rights that may be
disruptive of the rights of others.212
Counter-stories, like those told by indigenous peoples,2 13 are not
214
welcome in court.214 Judicially recognizing tribal oral history might require
acknowledgement of a country's colonial past and ill-treatment of its
indigenous peoples. 21 Unfortunately for Indians, colonization weakened
216itoindigenous oral history, making it more suspicious from an evidentiary
207. See, e.g., H. Elizabeth Dallam, The Growing Voice of Indigenous Peoples: Their
Use of Storytelling and Rights Discourse to Transform Multilateral Development Bank
Policies, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 119 (1991).
208. Russell, supra note 25, at 239 ("Regarding landownership, a member of a Tlingit
house traditionally inherited rights to the land that his or her clan owned. Clan ownership of
land was communal, and no single person had the right to sell or cede that property without
unanimous agreement of the clan.").
209. Dannenmaier, supra note 18, at 71 ("Having once denied sovereignty, title, and
often personhood to indigenous peoples, it is a difficult project to recognize collective
indigenous title (which has implications for tenurial relations and development decisions)
while allowing a surrounding state to retain ultimate sovereignty. It is a conflict at the heart
of decisions such as M'Intosh and Mabo, and one that remains difficult to reconcile.").
210. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 153 (statement of Mr. Macaulay) (quoting Transcript of
the Direct Examination of Chief Gyoluugyat [Mary McKenzie] at 455, Delgamuukw v. The
Queen).
211. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, How Judicial Hostility Toward Environmental Claims
and Intimidation Tactics by Lawyers Have Formed the Perfect Storm Against Environmental
Clinics: What's the Big Deal About Students and Chickens Anyway?, 25 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 249, 281 n.136 (2010).
212. See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202-03 (2005),
reh'g denied, 544 U.S. 1057 (2005).
213. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 655 ("In order for the Mashpee's legal claim to
make 'sense,' it must be phrased within a strictly legal context, and that context must include
the justification for displacing two centuries of 'the way things are."').
214. Dallam, supra note 207, at 123 ("[T]he legal forum is unreceptive to
counterstories.").
215. See Milward, supra note 6, at 302 (statement of John Borrows) ("As such, oral
tradition is controversial because it potentially undermines the law's claim to legitimacy
throughout the country due to the illegality and/or unconstitutionality of past actions.")
(quoting Borrows, supra note 50, at 26-27).
216. See Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 460 ("When the tide of history has
washed away any real acknowledgment of traditional law and any real observance of
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standpoint and vulnerable to judicial challenge, even when oral testimonies
corroborate that history.217 But where there is no evidence to contradict
oral history, judges should admit it into evidence.2 18
IV Evidentiary Barriers to the Acceptance ofIndigenous Oral History in
Court
"Law's flexibility helps to ensure that law and culture remain
consistent to the extent that law remains legitimate to the
members of the community. To the extent that law and culture
are not four square with each other (broadly speaking, of
course), law is illegitimate. '-219
There are "three simple ideas" underlying the various rules governing the
admission of evidence - evidence must be useful, reliable, and
probative. 22 0 The reliability requirement underpins two evidentiary rules
that courts use to bar the introduction of indigenous oral history: the
hearsay rule and the best evidence rule.
The hearsay rule excludes from evidence out-of-court statements
"offered for the truth of the statement[s]" being made.2 2' Hearsay
statements are considered "second hand" information,222 and courts
traditional customs, the foundation of native title has disappeared.") (quoting Mabo v.
Queensland (No. 2) 1992 (Brennan, J.)).
217. See id. at 456 ("Oral testimony reveals how the claimants understand their spiritual
traditions and their past and present relationships to their land and to each other. It might be
corroborated by the historical evidence, or conflict with it. Where there is an apparent
conflict, courts determine what impact this has on the weight to be attributed to oral
testimony.").
218. See Milward, supra note 6, at 311 ("Where there is no evidence to corroborate
otherwise reliable oral history evidence, but also no evidence to contradict it, nothing should
stop the judge from accepting the oral history evidence as reliable proof of the rights
claim.").
219. Fletcher, A Perfect Copy, supra note 83, at 98.
220. Newman, supra note 154, at 443 (statement of McLachlin, J.) ("Underlying the
diverse rules on the admissibility of evidence are three simple ideas. First, the evidence
must be useful in the sense of tending to prove a fact relevant to the issues in the case.
Second, the evidence must be reasonably reliable; unreliable evidence may hinder the search
for the truth more than help it. Third, even useful and reasonable reliable evidence may be
excluded in the discretion of the trial judge if its probative value is overshadowed by its
potential for prejudice.") (quoting Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] S.C.R. 911, para. 30 (Can.)).
221. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 130.
222. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 468 ("In traditional jurisprudence, the
general rule on the admissibility of oral testimony is that 'a witness can only give evidence
of a fact of which the witness has personal knowledge.' Any other source of knowledge,
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generally deem them "untrustworthy" because the "person who made the
out-of-court statement is not under oath, cannot be observed by the court,
and is not subject to cross-examination." 223 Oral history is archetypical
hearsay evidence.
The best evidence rule mandates that a court always be given the "best
evidence," which means that written evidence is preferred over oral
evidence in most circumstances. 224 This rule can significantly decrease the
evidentiary weight given to oral history when there is a written alternative.
Written history may 'contradict' oral history, yet oral history may not be
used to 'contradict' the written history.22 5
Rigid application of the best evidence and hearsay rules penalizes
indigenous societies for not keeping written records at a point in their
histories when European writing was unknown to them.226 Without more
flexibility in the rules of evidence, many indigenous land claims cannot
succeed in court.227 Canadian courts have demonstrated that evidentiary
rules can be modified in the interests of achieving "substantive justice" 228
and "a fairjustice system."229 But this must be done in a way that does not
compromise the fairness of the trial.
This part of the article discusses the interaction of the best evidence and
hearsay rules with oral history evidence and Canada's flexible approach to
whether it be what someone else has told the witness or something the witness has read, is
hearsay and generally inadmissible.") (quoting J.D. HEYDON, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 44 (6th
ed. 2000)).
223. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 130.
224. See Torres & Milun, supra note 5, at 654 ("[Those rules] give preference to
documentary evidence over 'mere' recollection of the Tribe's members.").
225. See Clay McLeod, The Oral Histories of Canada's Northern People, Anglo-
Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada's Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down
the Barriers of the Past, 30 ALTA. L. REV. 1276, 1282 (1992) (noting occasions in which
judges have allowed their "ethnocentric biases" favoring literate cultures to relegate oral
history by "implicitly den[ying] that it is useful as a primary source of historical
knowledge").
226. DUNCAN & PIGGOrr, supra note 4, at 25-26 n.153.
227. See Milward, supra note 6, at 301-02 (statement of Dwight Newman) ("[T]he law of
evidence and substantive law are in constant dialogue with each other. In this context, this
means that the rules of evidence must be developed dynamically and flexibly in order to
realise [sic] fair and substantive justice for Aboriginal rights claims.") (quoting Newman,
supra note 154).
228. Newman, supra note 154, at 439.
229. Id. at 440; see also id. at 443 n.66 (listing fairly recent cases where oral history was
admitted even though no historical confirmation).
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those rules. Canada's liberal use of judicial notice to facilitate admission of
oral history is also discussed.
A. The Hearsay Rule and Canada's Response to It
One of the principal evidentiary rules barring the admissibility of
indigenous oral history is "the hearsay rule."2 3 0  "Hearsay can be
unreliable .. . [and is not] the best obtainable evidence." 23 1 A court cannot
gainsay the truthfulness of a hearsay statement because it was not made
"under oath ... [and was] not subject to cross-examination." 23 2 Indigenous
oral history is quintessentially hearsay evidence, as neither the originator of
the story nor the original witnesses to it can be brought before the court.233
Canadian courts have two main avenues to admit oral history as
evidence. The first is a judicially created "principled approach" to the
hearsay rule,234 which reflects the constitutional directive that indigenous
rights and interests be recognized and affirmed. 2 35 This exception admits
aboriginal oral history under "certain circumstances,"2 36 which are similar
to those under the exception to the best evidence rule. Interestingly,
Canada's approach mirrors what is happening in other former
237commonwealth courts. For testimony to be admissible in Canada under
the hearsay rule, it must be both necessary and reliable. 23 8 U.S. courts also
admit hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability. 23 9 "Both
necessity and trustworthiness are determined by the application of common
sense and experience by the trial judge," 24 0 but the events referred to must
have "occurred before living memory."24 1 Necessity may be satisfied if the
230. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. E.g., id.
234. Milward, supra note 6, at 293 ("Aboriginal oral history evidence must instead be
admitted on a case-by-case basis under the principled approach.").
235. See BRUCE GRANVILLE MILLER, ORAL HISTORY ON TRIAL: RECOGNIZING
ABORIGINAL NARRATIVES IN THE COURTS 8-9, 157 (2011).
236. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68; see also Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra
note 34, at 468 ("There is no question that the admission of much of the oral testimony of
traditional laws and customs in native title trials is as an exception to the hearsay rule.")
237. See MacLaren, Barry & Sangster, supra note 112, at 125-26.
238. Milward, supra note 6, at 292.
239. See Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 61.
240. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68.
241. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 131.
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originator of the oral history or a witness to its recounting are dead and
cannot be produced before the court.24 2
Canadian courts, however, engage in a more detailed inquiry into the
reliability of the hearsay testimony 243 and require that the specific facts
surrounding the statement provide "reliability". 244 For example, a judge
will examine whether the person testifying was in a position to know her245
tribe's oral history and thus qualifies as a reliable source of that history.
The reputation of the declarant is key.246 Canadian courts look at whether
the statement might have been motivated by litigation and whether the
deceased person had any "interest in the matter" in dispute, which might
make her testimony "untruthful."2 47
The general "trustworthiness" of the oral history hearsay statements is
improved if the group accepted those statements "as their true history" and
were uttered and then repeated in public settings.248 Canadian courts
inquire into reliability before the witness actually takes the stand, which
allows for an early "testing" of the testimony, increasing the fairness of the
process.249 This preliminary declarant investigation allows "witnesses [to]
contradict or confirm the accuracy of the recitation," giving the histories
greater reliability. 25 0 This declarant-focused investigation is not, however,
in the form of a more rigorous voir dire,2 5 1 and courts, which have
discretion over how rigorous the inquiry should be, may even decide to not
do it at all.25 2
The second option for bypassing the hearsay roadblock for oral history
testimony is to use the standard hearsay exception for statements made by
individuals who are now deceased, if the statements relate to reputation or
pedigree.2 53 Canadian courts consider that oral history relating to public
242. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68.
243. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 154, at 436-37.
244. Milward, supra note 6, at 293 ("[E]ven reasonably reliable oral history evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is exceeded by its prejudicial effect.").
245. Id. at 294.
246. Id. at 308.
247. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68.
248. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 61 (quoting R.V. Dick, [1989] C.N.L.R. 132,
134 (Can. B.C. Prov. Ct.)).
249. Newman, supra note 154, at 446.
250. Milward, supra note 6, at 297.
251. Id. at 435.
252. Mitchell v. M.N.R., 2001 S.C.C. 33, para. 33 (Can.) (dictum).
253. Sherrott, supra note 13, at 444-45.
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reputation254 and family lineage255 as qualifying under this exception to the
hearsay rule.256 U.S. courts also admit hearsay evidence under the lineage
exception to the hearsay rule.25 7 Reputation can include community
knowledge, pedigree, family history, and genealogy, the latter two of which
are generally implicated in indigenous stories.258 Canadian courts admit
oral history about the location of boundaries under this reputation exception
to the hearsay rule, but recognize that this exception did not include
statements about the specific ways the tribes use the land.25 9 Because a
deceased person uttered these statements, they can also be admitted under
the unavailability hearsay exception if the twin criteria of necessity and
260reliability are met.
B. Getting Around the Best Evidence Rule
The best evidence rule requires that "if there is more than one way to
demonstrate a fact," the stronger method must be employed.2 61 In Canadian
courts, this rule has not prevented the introduction of oral testimony, if it is
both necessary and reliable.
Necessity requires that there be no other evidence available.26 2 Necessity
is easily established when dealing with an oral culture. Reliability,
254. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68 ("Reputation can involve ... community
acknowledgement of the existence of public or general rights, i.e., rights held by the entire
population or a particular segment of it.").
255. Id. ("Pedigree relates to declarations about family genealogy and history, such as
relationships and dates of births, marriages, and deaths.").
256. Napoleon, supra note 73, at 130.
257. See Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 72 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 535
(J.W. Strony ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
258. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68-69 ("As Aboriginal rights to land are
communal in nature, they generally come within the categories of public or general rights
that can be proven by declarations of reputation. Moreover, as kinship is integral to the
social structures and distribution of entitlements within many Aboriginal communities, the
pedigree exception can be relied upon as well in appropriate circumstances.").
259. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 63.
260. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 68.
261. Fed. R. Evid. 1002 (1972) ("An original writing, recording, or photograph is
required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides
otherwise.").
262. See Napoleon, supra note 73, at 130 ("The hearsay rule admits exceptions involving
oral histories: (1) necessity, such as when the person who witnessed the event is dead and
no one else is able to provide information of the same evidential quality, and (2) reliability-
the probability of trustworthiness, given the context of the reported statement or event (e.g.,
interest in the matter, when was the out-of- court statement was alleged to have been made?
etc.)").
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however, must be established on a case-by-case basis.263 Canadian courts
generally find oral history evidence reliable where there are "special
circumstances, such as when the information is transmitted at a public
gathering where there are witnesses as well as public affirmation of the
transmission." 26 4
The Tsihiqut'in v. British Columbia case set out additional criteria for the
admission of oral evidence under the best evidence rule. Those criteria
address the methods of preserving, transmitting, and protecting oral
history's truth, selecting who qualifies to learn and tell the group's history,
as well as information on the expertise, reliability, reputation, and personal
knowledge of witnesses.265 This type of inquiry can help the judge
determine the evidence's admissibility and weight.266
Other evidentiary principles might also be helpful to those seeking the
admission of indigenous oral history. For example, "the principle of
inference that allows a finding of one fact if it flows logically from another
proven fact" might allow judges to draw conclusions from oral history as a
logical inference from a proven fact.267 However, courts have great
discretion with respect to how they apply this principle of inference,
especially if the logical or rational nexus between the proven fact and the
fact to be inferred may be tenuous at best.26 8
C. The Use ofJudicial Notice to Bypass Evidentiary Barriers
In addition to liberal use of the exceptions to the best evidence and
hearsay rules, courts could use judicial notice to admit oral history. Judicial
notice gives a court some flexibility in its approach toward indigenous oral
history by allowing a "judge to make a finding of fact without evidentiary
263. See BRUCE G. MILLER, ORAL HISTORY ON TRIAL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL
NARRATIVES IN THE COURTS, 112 (2011) (noting that the admissibility and weight of such
evidence must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
264. See id. at 145-62.
265. Id.
266. Mitchell v. M.N.R, 2001 S.C.C. 33, para. 33 (Can.) (dictum) ("The trial judge need
not go so far as to find a special guarantee of reliability. However, inquiries as to the
witness's ability to know and testify to orally transmitted aboriginal traditions and history
may be appropriate both on the question of admis4ibility and the weight to be assigned the
evidence if admitted." (emphasis added)).
267. Milward, supra note 6, at 288.
268. Cf Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 467 ("Although the requirements of
proof make the strict application of rules of evidence unworkable, there are principles in the
rules of evidence that should be considered in the context of native title litigation. First, there
is a rule developed in the common law that recognises the dangers associated with absolute
findings of fact.").
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proof provided by the parties."26 9 Under this principle, courts can take
notice of matters that are common knowledge in the particular area in
which the court is located.270
"Canadian jurisprudence recognises [sic] that judicial notice can operate
to find facts that are distinctive to specific communities," including notice
of "local geography and historical facts." 2 7 ' The problem with applying
judicial notice to indigenous land claims is that knowledge about
indigenous peoples and their customs may not be common knowledge in
the community where the court is sitting,272 and historical and geographic
facts are "often vigorously disputed" in indigenous land claim cases.273
However, in an effort to reconcile the interests of their indigenous
peoples with non-indigenous peoples, Canadian courts gloss over the rule
that limits the scope of these disputes to members of the local indigenous
community and not to the wider society.274 This thereby allows for more
accurate fact-finding about distinct indigenous groups.
Another issue to consider when applying judicial notice to gain
admissibility of oral history evidence is the application itself. The
application of judicial notice may reflect cultural biases of the indigenous
applicant.27 5 Courts have wide discretion in how they apply judicial
27
notice.276 Nonetheless, Canadian courts have utilized what one judge called
a "contextualized application of judicial notice to fill in the blanks in the
written historical record." 27 7 Courts can determine the usefulness of oral
testimony by looking at three factors: corroboration, repeatability, and
consistency.278 For example, a court can verify oral history evidence "with
other oral history testimony" or "see if other witnesses repeat the same
story."279
269. Milward, supra note 6, at 289.
270. Id. at 317 ("[Flacts notorious and generally accepted within a local community can
properly fall within the scope ofjudicial notice.").
271. Id. at289, 318-19.
272. See Palmer, supra note 23, at 1047 (suggesting overcoming this problem by holding
court on Indian reservations).
273. Milward, supra note 6, at 316 (discussing judicial notice).
274. Id. at 289.
275. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 78 ("What one person may consider a
stereotypical myth may be a fact beyond dispute to another person.").
276. Id. at 79.
277. Milward, supra note 6, at 318.
278. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 695.
279. Id.
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Even when oral history is admissible, a court must still evaluate its
authenticity 2"0 and determine what weight to give it.2 8 1 The claimants bear
the burden of proving each element of their claim.2 82  Canadian and
Australian courts have lowered the burden of proof in cases involving
indigenous treaty and rights claims 283 in an effort to respect indigenous
claims within their modem judicial systems.
V The Striking Difference Between How Canadian and US. Courts Treat
Indigenous Oral History
Underlying all these issues is the need for a sensitive and
generous approach to the evidence tendered to establish
aboriginal rights, be they the right to title or lesser rights to fish,
hunt or gather. Aboriginal peoples did not write down events in
their pre-sovereignty histories. Therefore, orally transmitted
history must be accepted, provided the conditions of usefulness
and reasonable reliability set out in Mitchell v. MN.R., are
respected.284
As the prior sections of this article show, Canadian courts have a much
more lenient attitude toward indigenous oral history. This is evidenced by
their liberal interpretation of the exceptions to the best evidence and
hearsay rules, by the judicious use of judicial notice, by lightening the
burden of proof, and by not requiring the presentation of corroborating
evidence. 285 Even Justice Vickers, in his landmark Tsihlqot'in decision, said
he would use anthropological, archaeological and historical records to
corroborate oral history evidence.286 Another possible way to affirm the
reliability of oral history is to examine its consistency with other known
truths.2 8 7 While Canadian courts have yet to hand down a pro-indigenous
280. Validation can be done through oral testimony or through multiple witnesses
corroborating the same story. See id. at 695.
281. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 86 (noting that the courts should be cautious
in assigning weight to oral history even when admissible under the rules of evidence).
282. Roness & McNeil, supra note 132, at 66.
283. Gover & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 56. But see id. at 89 (explaining that even
when aboriginal oral history is admitted, it is given little weight).
284. R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43 (Can.), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220.
285. Milward, supra note 6, at 288; see supra Part IV.
286. See MacLaren, Barry & Sangster, supra note 112, at 128-29 (discussing
Tsilhquot'in decision).
287. Threedy, supra note 69, at 113 ("[I]n addition to assessing the internal consistency
and completeness of a story, listeners will consider whether the story is consistent with what
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decision, the favorable policies, discussed above, make such outcomes
possible, even likely.2 88
This has led some critics to complain that although Canadian courts are
announcing favorable judicial policies toward oral history evidence, the
practical application of such policies is disappointing.2 89 Perhaps Canadian
courts have done less than their critics would like because they are reluctant
to set in place hard rules that could not possibly cover all factual
permutations in these types of cases. 29 0 Despite the potential disparities
between theory and actual practice, and regardless of the critiques, it is
nevertheless striking to consider the attitudinal differences of Canada's
judicial approach to oral history.
The animating approach of Canadian courts toward the evidentiary issues
of indigenous oral history is to be conscious of "the special nature of
aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right
which originates in times where there were no written records of the
practices, customs and traditions engaged in."2 9 1  Canadian courts are
specifically enjoined "not [to] undervalue the evidence presented by
aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform
precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for
example, a private law torts case."2 92
The reason for Canada's generous attitude toward indigenous land
claims, and the use of oral history to support them, most likely is its
adoption of Section 35 as an amendment to its Constitution in 1982. This
amendment requires that the rights of indigenous peoples be "recognized
and affirmed" through a process of reconciling indigenous and non-
is known about how the world works. In the case of the shields, the question thus becomes
whether the Navajo account of the hiding of the shields is consistent with what is known
about the Navajos from the anthropological and historical perspectives.").
288. See MacLaren, Barry & Sangster, supra note 112, at 136 (discussing Tsilhquot'in
decision) ("While Aboriginal claimants still await the first judicially secured award of
Aboriginal title, the pragmatic application of the Tsilhquot'in Nation Order at trial sets the
framework for making this aspiration a practical reality."). But see Sherrott, supra note 13,
at 449.
289. Milward, supra note 6, at 288 ("Since the enunciation of these principles, however,
Canadian courts have consistently demonstrated hostile treatment of oral history evidence
with the consequence of dismissing Aboriginal rights claims . . . [by]draw[ing] on a
principle that Aboriginal oral history should not be given more weight than it can reasonably
support ... [and]habitually characteris[ing] written historical and documentary evidence as
more reliable and persuasive than oral history evidence.").
290. See Newman, supra note 154, at 444.
291. R v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, para. 68 (Can.).
292. Newman, supra note 154, at 441 (citing Van Der Peet, 2 S.C.R. at para. 68).
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indigenous interests.293 This constitutional amendment acknowledges the
"historical injustices" done to indigenous peoples.2 94
Negotiation between indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians is part of
the concept of reconciliation, which requires the recognition by non-
indigenous Canadians that first Nation Peoples approach the bargaining
table "in the same state they were in 500 years ago, as organized societies
existing prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty . . . [with a] distinct
[conception] of how to lead good lives."2 95 The concept of reconciliation,
however, does not mean that the rights of the non-indigenous or competing
public interests should be ignored in the process of achieving it.2 9 6
Since the passage of Section 35, Canadian courts, particularly Canada's
Supreme Court, have accepted indigenous oral history on an equal footing
with written evidence. 2 97 This means that oral history evidence "is to be
given a real and fair chance to prove an [a]boriginal rights claim . . . [and
that] if the oral history evidence is to be subjected to a critical inquiry as to
its ultimate reliability, then the documentary and historical evidence should
be subjected to that kind of inquiry as well." 2 98 To do otherwise would
create a constitutional inconsistency.2 99
Reconciliation also means that evidence presented by First Nations must
be viewed from the perspective of the indigenous claimants, 300 with all the
forgiveness that such a directive implies. In other words, the Canadian
constitution enjoins courts to make every effort to understand and accept
293. See DUNCAN & PIGGOTr, supra note 4, app. E., at 22, 73.
294. Id. at 71.
295. DUNCAN & PIGGOT, supra note 4, app. E., at 72 (quoting Gordon Christie, Judicial
Justification of Recent Developments in Aboriginal Law?, 17 CAN. J.L. Soc'Y 41, 69-70
(2002)).
296. Brian Slattery, The Metamorphosis ofAboriginal Title, 65 CAN. BAR. REv. 255, 282
(2006) ("However, by the same token, the recognition of historical title, while a necessary
precondition for modem reconciliation, is not in itself a sufficient basis for reconciliation,
which must take into account a range of other factors. So, for example, to suggest that
historical aboriginal title gives rise to modem rights that automatically trump third party and
public interests constitutes an attempt to remedy one grave injustice by committing
another.").
297. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Does Constitutional Change Matter? Canada's Recognition
ofAboriginal Title, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 449,485 (2005).
298. Milward, supra note 6, at 312.
299. Carlson, supra note 297, at 467 (explaining how the Delgamuukw court "concluded
that the inadmissibility of Aboriginal oral traditions could prevent Aboriginal peoples from
every being able to establish their historical claims and that this would be unacceptable
under the [Canadian] Constitution.").
300. Id. at 466-67.
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indigenous oral history as evidence. Applying these principles to the best
evidence and hearsay rules allows indigenous oral history to have a greater
chance of admissibility as proof in a land claim.
Despite that the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the admission of
hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability like Canada,30 1 with rare
exception, this principle has not been applied to indigenous oral history.302
One such exception is a 1987 decision by the Court of Claims, where "the
Court found that the ancient ties of the Zuni to the land in question were
'manifest in the tribal oral tradition about Zuni origin and migration and in
the physical artifacts representing the archaeological history of Zuni
culture."303 The court specifically found evidentiary value in the tribe's oral
tradition "because of the importance attached in the community to accurate
transmission of oral history," and the presentation of oral history in a
deposition form made it "more persuasive to [the] court." 30 4 The validity of
the testimony was established "through corroboration between different
pieces of the oral history testimony;305 'reliability,' or repeatability, tested
through the ability of deponents to tell the same story on various occasions;
and 'consistency,' meaning the conformity of testimony with other
testimony." 3 0 6
However, by requiring corroboration, unlike Canadian courts, the Court
of Claims gave the impression that oral history was less valuable than
documentary evidence.307 Also by limiting oral history evidence to "to
cases where the chain of oral transmission can be traced to Indians who had
actual knowledge of the time of pre-contact occupancy[,] a circumstance
that even in the recently settled Western states is increasingly
impossible[,]" 0 8 the court all but assured that such oral history evidence
would not be admitted in this or any future cases before that court.
301. Newman, supra note 154, at 441 ("The United States Supreme Court adopted an
approach permitting the admission of hearsay based on necessity and reliability as early as
1960, and the judgment accomplishing the change seems to contain these values.").
302. But see Jefferson, supra note 65, at 114 (explaining that the Supreme Court based its
1941 decision "recogni[zing] the legitimacy of Hualapai land claims against the Santa Fe
Railroad . . . on the presence of artifacts, customary usage of other objects of material
culture, as well as traditional oral history narratives.").
303. Newman, supra note 154, at 448 (noting that this decision does not provide a
"ringing endorsement of oral history.").
304. Id.
305. Stohr, supra note 2, at 692.
306. Newman, supra note 154, at 448.
307. Stohr, supra note 2, at 693.
308. Id.
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More common in U.S. courts are decisions like Coos Bay, where the
court saw no evidentiary value in oral history and dismissed the oral history
evidence given by twenty-one tribal members because a majority of those
members may have been bias to the case's outcome. 3 0 9 An American legal
treatise even warns lawyers representing Indians in land claim cases from
using oral history because the declarants may be "far removed from the
issue in question, in point of time, and may have an interest in the outcome
of the case."3 10 Showing a preference for documentary evidence, the text
went on to say that while oral history evidence may be "entitled to some
weight and may not be ignored or discarded by the Indian Claims
Commission as 'literally worthless,' such evidence may be given less
weight than contradictory evidence which the court deems to be 'more
reliable,' particularly when such other evidence is supplemented by reliable
historical accounts."31
Interestingly, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act ("NAGPRA") accomplishes statutorily what U.S. courts have been
largely unwilling to do; namely putting oral history on equal footing with
documentary evidence.3 12 The statute makes storytelling part of the
adjudicative process.1  It also explicitly treats hearsay evidence as
competent evidence by requiring that "the decision-maker must consider
oral tradition" in determining "the strength of a claim of cultural
affiliation." 3 14
Although arguably the courts in both countries are still outfitted with the
trappings of colonialism reflecting a non-Indian bias," Canada has
fortunately taken steps to acknowledge and rectify this problem, and has
309. Id. at 691 ("In Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, the court dismissed the
testimony of twenty-one Indian witnesses who gave the oral history of their Tribe because
their testimony was in conflict with contemporary documentary evidence. The court alluded
that the testimony may have been biased because seventeen of the witnesses had 'a direct
interest in the outcome of [the] case."').
310. M.J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian
Lands, 41 A.L.R. 425,436 (1979).
311. Id.
312. Threedy, supra note 69, at 108.
313. Id. at 109 ("One of the most interesting aspects of thinking about the role of stories
under NAGPRA is that the statute explicitly incorporates storytelling into the adjudicative
process.").
314. Id.
315. Furniss, supra note 8, at 196 (discussing British Columbia Supreme Court Justice
McEachem's dismissal of anthropological testimony in Delgamuukw as "unscientific and
biased").
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used courts as part of this process. U.S. courts have not taken such steps of
reconciliation and still appear dedicated to assimilating Indians into the
dominant culture and eliminating their separateness, including their
separate land base.316 Acknowledging tribal oral history as proof of the
legitimacy of a tribal land claim would undermine a long judicial history of
non-recognition. But without the compulsion of a constitutional directive
or even a spontaneous utterance by the Supreme Court, which seems highly
unlikely, 317 there is little reason to expect that U.S. courts will follow the
Canadian example. They have barely entered the fray.
Conclusion
"The battle between orality and literacy is a battle over what constitutes
truth[,]" and the "triumph of literacy is a triumph of certainty over
reason."318 It is also a battle over memory and what "constitutes history," 319
and the stories nations preserve to ensure their survival. 32 0 The battlefield
has been the courthouse, and the weapons employed by courts to block the
admission of indigenous oral history have been the rules of evidence.
Despite invasion and obstruction brought by contact with Europeans,
indigenous peoples have preserved their history through stories, artifacts,
and rituals. 32 1  But everything about oral history evidence presents a
challenge to a court accustomed to written and recorded evidence. Canada
has encouraged its courts to surmount these problems by amending its
Constitution to require the reconciliation of the interests of its indigenous
peoples with non-indigenous Canadians. In response to this mandate,
316. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 2010 Dillon Lecture: Rebooting Indian Law in the Supreme
Court, 55 S.D. L. REV. 510, 512-16, 517 (2010) (recounting the many losses tribal interests
have suffered in federal courts).
317. Id. at 511 (arguing that without "a viable long-term strategy . .. tribal interests are
and will continue to be punching bags in Supreme Court litigation").
318. Stohr, supra note 2, at 680 ("[C]ourts generally celebrate this victory.").
319. Id. ("[T]he oral basis for Native American religions is the most important factor
explaining the lack of success experienced by Indian Tribes and individuals attempting to
use federal courts to protect sacred sites and to recognize the Indians' Free Exercise claims").
320. Reilly, Ghost of Truganini, supra note 34, at 462 ("The centrality of the pioneer in
Australian history is perpetuated by the authority granted pioneer histories in native title
litigation. The pioneer becomes not only the maker of the nation, but of its history as well.")
321. Stohr, supra note 2, at 684 ("In reality, Native American cultures are not static; they
changed and evolved radically both before and after European contact, and as living cultures
continue to do so today. Through their oral literature, Native Americans have preserved this
history, although the differences in emphasis, style and organization [of that history] often
have led non-Natives to view this history skeptically or to deny its existence altogether.").
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Canada's courts have adopted a liberal vision of the exceptions to the best
evidence and hearsay rules and used judicial notice to put indigenous oral
history on equal footing with written evidence.
Canada's 1982 amendment of its constitution set the country's courts on
a mission to make amends for what it did to its indigenous peoples
throughout much of that country's colonial and post-colonial history. The
country recognized that indigenous peoples had been wrongly displaced
from their lands and restitution required opening the courts to claims for the
return of those lands. Oral history became a critical component of
establishing those claims, and the constitutional mandate could not be
fulfilled if that evidence was not allowed to be heard. The story in the
United States is quite different. There has been no formal recognition of
wrongs done to Indians by removing them from their ancestral lands.
There is no procedural reason that U.S. courts cannot follow Canada's
lead. No evidentiary rule stands in our way, and there is no evidentiary
exception that cannot be liberally interpreted to favor indigenous rights.
What Canadian courts have done since 1982 is not revolutionary from an
evidentiary rule perspective; it is only revolutionary from the standpoint of
its substantive impact. The U.S. must also reconcile and allow procedural
and evidentiary rules to achieve fair outcomes for its indigenous peoples.
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